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Introduction
In classical antiquity, many accepted the idea that animals’ behaviors were 
signs of future changes in the weather. The rules for making such forecasts pro-
liferated in collections that form a coherent tradition of weather signs.1 The earli-
est extant collection dedicated to weather signs, now attributed to Theophrastus 
but considered to be by Aristotle for centuries, provided an extensive list of signs 
and eliminated «any philosophical underpinning or scientific framework» that 
might link the appearances of the sun, moon, and animal behaviors to weather.2 
This tradition of weather signs runs from Theophrastus through Aratus of Soli’s 
Phaenomena to Roman works, including three extant Latin translations of Ara-
tus, Pliny’s Natural History, and Virgil’s Georgics. These works show little inter-
est in causal explanation and were instead devoted to poetic virtuosity or trans-
mitting traditional knowledge that could be applied to agricultural and other 
manual endeavors.3
Subsequently, animal signs for weather prediction were marginalized in the 
ancient and medieval astrological traditions. Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos (2.13), a 
foundational astrological text, while containing a number of meteorological 
weather signs, puts forward no animal signs; and al-Kindi’s De mutatione tempo-
rum concentrated on astrology for its rules for weather forecasting.4 Weather pre-
diction found in medieval written sources is, for the most part, astrometeorologi-
cal.5 Nevertheless, the ancient tradition of weather signs persisted and was re-
vived in the early modern period, bolstered by more expansive readings of ancient 
sources. In the sixteenth century, a number of thinkers, including Pietro Pompon-
azzi, Agostino Nifo, and Ulisse Aldrovandi, sought to uncover the hidden causes 
1. Liba Taub, Ancient Meteorology, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 37-69.
2. Theophrastus, On Weather Signs, ed. by C. W. Brunschön, David Sider, Leiden, Brill, 2007, 
p. 4.
3. Taub, Ancient Meteorology, pp. 43-58.
4. Al-Kindi, Scientific Weather Forecasting in the Middle Ages, ed. by Gerrit Bos, Charles 
Burnett, London, Kegan Paul International, 2000.
5. Stuart Jenks, Astrometeorology in the Middle Ages, in «Isis», 74 (1983), pp. 185-210.
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behind the connections between animals and weather. Their theories, in turn, re-
veal diverse attitudes toward divination and augury, astrological influences, and 
the relation between signs and efficient causation. In sum, Renaissance under-
standings of the purported links between animal behavior and weather reveal 
cosmological, epistemological, and theological commitments; views on the dif-
ferences between humans and animals; and the willingness to transform ancient 
literary traditions uncovered by humanist investigations into material for natural 
philosophy and natural history. 
Animals as Weather Signs in the Ancient and Medieval Tradition
Theophrastus’s On Weather Signs lists phenomena used to forecast changes 
in weather. The work is organized according to the category of weather. Separate 
sections treat signs of rain, winds, storms, fair weather, and then finally miscel-
laneous signs. A typical sign is sparse in its formulation, indicating the sign and 
then the effect. For example, one reads: «A raven in winter producing many 
sounds is a sign of storm».6 Theophrastus considered animal signs to be less reli-
able than those based on the appearances of the sun and the moon and on the 
rising and settings of constellations that correspond to the changing of the sea-
sons.7
Despite the absence of elaborate causes in this treatise, Peripatetics sought 
out such explanations elsewhere. It is possible that this work was meant to be a 
collection of observations that could be used to formulate general rules or to in-
vestigate the links between sign and effect. A few of the examples in Theophras-
tus’s collection correspond to passages in Aristotle’s works where he formulated 
potential causal explanations for animals’ forecasting of the weather. For exam-
ple, in On Weather Signs, the time when flocks of cranes fly is described as indi-
cating when storms will arise.8 In the History of Animals, Aristotle seems to have 
justified the use of the behavior of cranes as an indicator of storms on the grounds 
that they are highly intelligent and capable of flying to great heights where they 
can see clouds and other meteorological indications of bad weather. The causes 
are thus linked to the birds’ sagacity and their access to information that is not 
available to humans positioned at lower elevations.9
While Theophrastus maintained that his weather signs were based on obser-
vations either made by him and his associates or by others of «no small repute», 
the use of animals, in particular birds, as a means of predicting the future corre-
sponds to traditions of augury practiced in the ancient world. Many of these prac-
6. Theophrastus, On Weather Signs, p. 85.
7. Ibid., pp. 61-63.
8. Ibid, p. 83.
9. Arist., HA, 9.10.614b18-21.
 Theories of Animals as Weather Signs in Renaissance Italy 23
tices were based on interpreting the flight of birds.10 Although ancient philoso-
phers presented diverse accounts of divination, there was widespread belief that 
it was difficult to understand why animals might help predict the weather and the 
outcomes of human affairs. Indeed, Epicurus suggested that the correspondence 
between weather and signs from animals resulted from mere coincidence.11 To the 
contrary, some Stoic philosophers gave justifications for divination based on the 
idea that all events form part of a causal chain that ultimately depends on God’s 
providence. For Stoics, augury and induction based on animal signs are valid 
because they derive from the same divine mind that orders the universe.12 Simi-
larly, Cicero in De divinatione recounted the idea, without endorsing it, that a 
«divine mind» (divina mens) causes the flight of birds that function as omens.13 
Cicero, however, seemingly remained skeptical of the possibility of explaining 
animal signs. This dialogue refers to an attempt made by the Stoic philosopher 
Boethus of Sidon, the author of a non-extant commentary on Aratus’s Phaenom-
ena. Boethus gave a plausible account of why the heavens and the sky can help 
prognosticate the future but failed to explain why animal behaviors do. «Who is 
there who could suspect that frogs foresee this?» Boethus asked. He answered 
only that they have a power of foresight beyond human understanding.14 The 
character of the dialogue named Marcus Cicero expressed skepticism about the 
use of birds’ flights in augury more generally, that is, in predicting not the weath-
er but the outcomes of human endeavors. He described it as an erroneous practice 
of the ancients that survives only as part of traditional religion, contending that 
Roman society retained this practice, like many rites, to bolster the authority of 
the republic.15 In contrast to Cicero’s character in the De divinatione, some late-
antique Platonists endorsed both the efficacy of augury and of divination using 
animals. Notably, Plotinus, in the Enneads, theorizing that the world is a single 
unity, used the concepts of sympathy and coordination to argue that all parts of 
the world form a chain. The existence of this chain suggests that divination 
through both stars and birds can announce the future.16 It appears, however, that 
in this passage Plotinus was considering birds in the augural practices that predict 
outcomes for human actions rather than as signs for the weather.
In the Latin Middle Ages, the distinction between weather signs and augury 
remained, reinforced not just by skepticism toward the effectiveness of augury but 
also by doubts about its religious legality for Christians.17 Despite persistent con-
10. Theophrastus, On Weather Sign, p. 61.
11. Taub, Ancient Meteorology, pp.  37-38; Epicur., Letter to Pythocles, in D.L., 10.98-9.
12. Francis Henry Sandbach, The Stoics, London, Duckworth, 1989, pp. 79-82; Samuel Sam-
bursky, Physics of the Stoics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 65-71.
13. Cic., Div., 1.53.
14. Ibid., 1.9.
15. Ibid., 2.33.
16. Plot., Enn., 2.3.7.
17. Alexander Fidora, Divination and Scientific Prediction: The Epistemology of Prognostic 
Sciences in Medieval Europe, in «Early Science and Medicine», 18 (2013), pp. 517-535.
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cerns about augury, a few medieval zoological writings discussed animal signs. 
Albertus Magnus wrote the most extensive and influential Aristotelian consider-
ation of zoology in medieval Latin Christendom. His De animalibus consists of 
twenty-six books and contains a mixture of his own observations, reports from an-
tiquity, philosophical discussions, and zoological anatomy. The distinction between 
observing animals as augury or as weather signs determines Albertus’s willingness 
to investigate causation. Albertus reported beliefs about the ominous or propitious 
properties of animals but refused to conjecture about their causes. For example, 
after citing the appearance of crows and vultures, known for their sagacity, which 
presages dangers and the destruction of civilization, he narrated a recent occurrence 
in Sweden in which the presence of a flock of crows preceded the death of the local 
count. In this case, Albertus did not deign to attribute a cause. He maintained that 
«to dispute on the wisdom and the conjectures of augurs belongs to another sci-
ence», presumably theology.18 Elsewhere, he cut short his discussion of the ca-
ladrius, a bird that according to legend is capable of diagnosing disease, since the 
topic was closer to a case of augury than to a subject of natural philosophy.19
As for weather signs, Albertus put forth several explanations that refer to the 
intelligence, sagacity, and sensations of animals. He held that animals differ in 
sagacity or prudence relative to the degree that they imitate man’s perfection and 
rationality.20 Some weather signs result from the animals’ prudent desire for self-
preservation or ease of life. Dolphins signal maritime storms because they seek 
safety near the shore.21 Ducks seek to fly with winds that aid their flight, thus it is 
possible to predict winds, cold, and rain from their paths.22 The sandfish (scincus 
scincus), a lizard native to northern Africa, announces the direction of imminent 
storms when it protects itself from oncoming winds.23 Albertus was open to the 
idea that the especially sensitive senses of birds and other animals were superior 
to those of humans. Roosters, because they «easily sense the changes in the air 
that result from the motions of the sun», are capable of marking time with their 
crowing.24 The echeneis naucrates, or remora, a fish that according to legend was 
capable of stopping ships, presages storms as it feels the underlying matter of 
winds rise up from the depth of the sea and then stabilizes itself by attaching itself 
to rock «just like an anchor».25 
18. Albertus Magnus, De animalibus libri XXVI, 2 voll., ed. by Clemens Baeumker, Münster, 
Aschendorff, 1916, I, pp. 618-619.
19. Ibid., II, p. 1446.
20. Guy Guldentops, The Sagacity of Bees: An Aristotelian Topos in Thirteenth-century Phi-
losophy, in Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. by Carlos Steel, Guy Gul-
dentops, Pieter Buellens, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1999, p. 285.
21. Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, II, p. 1530.
22. Ibid., II, p. 1441.
23. Ibid., II, p. 1546.
24. Ibid., II, p. 1496.
25. Ibid., II, p. 1532.
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Albertus put forth a nearly identical description of the cuttlefish’s supposed 
capacity for predicting storms; when they sense vapors, they bind themselves to 
rocks before the storm thereby protecting themselves from the sea’s violence. 
Albertus linked this ability to prognosticate to his understanding of psychology. 
He theorized that cuttlefish were among the «dull and imprudent animals» that 
are more capable of predicting such dangers better than wiser and more prudent 
animals. He proposed that these duller animals being less concerned with them-
selves are more capable of receiving external impressions.26
This explanation parallels the Aristotelian account of the alleged phenome-
non that only stupid people receive divinations in their dreams, an account that 
Albertus endorsed. Aristotle maintained that some sense stimuli are too faint to be 
noticed while awake because conscious humans are overwhelmed by a flood of 
sensations. While asleep, however, some people can perceive these slight sensa-
tions. The sleeper’s faculties of perception exaggerate the input, so a small noise 
becomes loud thunder in a dream. Similarly, the first stages of diseases, caused by 
humoral imbalance, might be noticed during sleep despite being imperceptible 
while conscious. In this manner, a dream can be a sign of future disease. Beyond 
these harbingers of physical distress, Aristotle thought it could be possible that 
other kinds of movements and perceptions might enter dormant souls prompting 
the receiver to use these vivid reveries for divination. Some people are more sus-
ceptible than others to these telling dreams, according to Aristotle. Categorizing 
humans by their temperaments and by their mental capacities, he thought that the 
melancholic, those with unstable minds, the garrulous, and the simple are prone 
to possessing this extraordinary divinatory ability because their own thoughts are 
not strong enough to obscure these faint stimuli.27 Accordingly, Albertus applied 
an analogous explanation for the supposed phenomena that some less intelligent 
animals, like the cuttlefish, sense dangers more quickly and consequently their 
behaviors are more apt to be harbingers of storms.
Pomponazzi and Nifo
Because Albertus’s De animalibus was the most extensive philosophical 
treatment of animals written during the later Middle Ages, it had a considerable 
impact on Renaissance understandings of zoology.28 During the Renaissance, 
prominent Italian philosophers, such as Pietro Pomponazzi and Agostino Nifo, 
were well aware of his views and at times cited them.
Divination came under renewed scrutiny in the years around 1500. Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola tried to discredit astrology and his nephew Gianfrancesco 
26. Ibid., II, p. 1340.
27. Arist., Div. Somn., 2.463b12-22. 
28. Stefano Perfetti, Aristotle’s Zoology and its Renaissance Commentators, 1521-1601, Leu-
ven, Leuven University Press, 2000, pp. 1-3.
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Pico warned of the theological dangers of prognostication and divination.29 De-
spite rejecting many forms of divination as irreligious and superstitious, Gian-
francesco Pico allowed prediction that could be justified causally or experien-
tially. For example, predicting that wood will burn when exposed to fire is neither 
foolhardy nor impious, he contended.30 Animal signs are also potentially legiti-
mate. In his view, animals can presage the future because they act according to 
their natural instinct that impels them toward safety and comfort. For example, 
swallows’ acute senses and small bodies allow them to flee Zephyr, a westerly 
wind, before humans are able to sense it.31 Thus, for Gianfrancesco Pico, knowl-
edge of the causes behind animals’ behavior can help predict future weather and 
legitimize it as a permissible form of prognostication.
Pomponazzi dismissed the wholesale rejection of divination found in Gian-
francesco Pico’s works and retained causal structures similar to those of Stoics to 
explain why animals are signs of the future. While professor of philosophy at 
Bologna, he wrote two of the most controversial philosophical works of the first 
decades of the sixteenth century: De immortalitate animae and De incantationi-
bus. Both are notable for their naturalism. De immortalitate animae, printed in 
1516, argued that according to Aristotle and the dictates of Peripatetic philosophy 
it is probable that the human intellect does not survive the death of the body. The 
treatise set in motion waves of incriminations, defenses, and apologies.32 De in-
cantationibus, written in 1520, was not printed until decades after Pomponazzi’s 
death in 1525, although it circulated widely in manuscript in the years immedi-
ately after its composition.33 In that work, Pomponazzi contended that the use of 
demons as a philosophical explanation did not conform to reason or experience 
and that explanations based only on natural causes could better account for a wide 
range of seemingly miraculous or preternatural phenomena, including human 
powers of divination. In his discussion of divination, he found parallels between 
animal and human capacities to understand the future. Like Albertus, he wished 
to understand why animal behavior predicts weather. Unlike Albertus, he be-
lieved their use as a forecasting tool is related to the foundations of the ancient art 
of augury, which he maintained was an effective divinatory practice.
In the tenth chapter of De incantationibus, Pomponazzi proposed that appa-
ritions, visions, and dreams that signify the future are not supernatural but the 
result of natural causes that ultimately stem from God’s care for the universe and 
29. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, ed. by 
Eugenio Garin, 2 voll., Torino, Nino Aragno, 2004.
30. Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, De rerum praenotione libri novem, Strasbourg, Kno-
bloch, 1507, sigg. Eiv-Eiir.
31. Ibid., sig. Eiir.
32. Paul Richard Blum, The Immortality of the Soul, in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. by James Hankins, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 211-233.
33. Laura Regnicoli, Produzione e circolazione dei testimoni manoscritti del De incantationi-
bus, in Pietro Pomponazzi: Tradizione e dissenso, ed. by Marco Sgarbi, Firenze, Olschki, 2010, pp. 
131-180.
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from the celestial intelligences’ providential ordering of the universe.34 He asked 
rhetorically whether, just as astrologers can make predictions from the stars, «is 
it not possible that these [signs] can be recognized even in beasts?»35 For exam-
ple, expert sailors can predict storms using various signs.36 But ancient historians 
recounted that animals predicted more than the weather, accounts which Pom-
ponazzi accepted because of the authority of ancient sources. Relying on histo-
ries, he contended that the significant turning points of the lives of famous men 
are preannounced by seers who interpret signs that are visible in «beasts, plants, 
the elements».37
Pomponazzi explained that these indications of the future might be the result 
of celestial bodies that affect and alter the air, creating the appearance of soldiers 
or saints in the sky. Alternatively, they might make similar impressions directly 
on the soul, either during sleep or even on those who are awake, if they are free 
from worries and have a clear mind. People who directly receive these impres-
sions – Pomponazzi wrote – are like «animals that have foreknowledge of future 
events».38 Many of the examples of animals that he gave – the rooster who senses 
the new day and changes in weather, the crow that is a sign of a massacre, and 
dolphins that indicate storms – are found in Albertus’s De animalibus. He wrote 
that these animals are stellae secundae (second stars) and, contrary to Theophras-
tus, are more reliable indicators of the weather than celestial bodies because they 
«are closer to the effects that will be produced». As a result, sailors and farmers 
make «more certain predictions» than astrologers.39 
Pomponazzi extended the ability of animals to predict the future to human 
events in addition to the weather. This ability derives from links between animals’ 
natures and the ordering power of the heavens. The crow that signifies future evils 
is fleeing his normal habitat because of the «impression of celestial bodies» that 
are responsible for the cataclysms. In an argument that has a clear parallel in Ci-
cero’s De divinatione, Pomponazzi contended that some birds have internal prop-
erties – analogous to the hidden powers of materia medica, like scammony – that 
are the reason that their movements to the left or right or their songs signify fa-
vorable or unfavorable outcomes for humans. This knowledge depends not on 
philosophical reasoning. Rather, «we know this through much experience», that 
is, that crows and other birds have internal properties and natures that react to 
celestial causes.40 In his eyes, animals are part of a chain of causation that begins 
34. Guido Giglioni, Il cielo sopra l’Aquila. Pietro Pomponazzi su immaginazione e devozione 
popolare, in Pietro Pomponazzi: Tradizione e dissenso, ed. by Marco Sgarbi, Firenze, Olschki, 
2010, pp. 271-283.
35. Pietro Pomponazzi, De incantationibus, ed. by Vittoria Perrone Compagni, Firenze, Ol-
schki, 2011, p. 86.
36. Ibid., p. 86.
37. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
38. Ibid., p. 92.
39. Ibid., p. 92.
40. Ibid., p. 95; Cic., Div., 1.10.
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with God, moves through the intelligences and their celestial spheres, and alters 
the animals below in a determined and providential manner that allows humans, 
at least some of them, to know the future.
In the De immortalitate animae, Pomponazzi argued that the fact that ani-
mals presage not just the weather but human events suggests that they are part of 
a cosmic chain of causation and that the heavens can directly form impressions 
on the human soul about the future. Thus, animal signs confirm the possibility of 
natural divination in humans. He believed that there was continuity between ani-
mals and the bulk of humanity; most humans, and especially those who live in 
extreme climates, do not use their intellect and thus live like beasts.41 This conti-
nuity is reflected in the shared ability to prognosticate. According to Pomponazzi, 
celestial bodies produce portentous wonders and prodigies for the goodness of 
humankind, and their making of portents «in sheep» suggests that they should 
also be able do the same in people who possess powers of divination.42 Citing a 
passage from Aristotle’s History of Animals, which recounted that crows left Ath-
ens and the Peloponnese at the time when mercenaries under Medius were killed 
at Pharsalus as evidence that the birds have a sense of the unfolding of the future, 
Pomponazzi concluded that some humans must also have this capacity to predict 
the future.43 Thus, he asked: «If birds and many other beings that lack reason can 
indicate through the impression of the heavens, why not also humans similar to 
them?»44 Animals’ ability to foretell the future, whether as weather signs or as 
auguries of human events, reveals their place in the cosmic order as well as the 
capacities of the human soul to receive knowledge directly from the celestial in-
telligences.
For decades Agostino Nifo was Pomponazzi’s rival. They engaged in heated 
disputes while teaching at Padua in the first years of the sixteenth century. Later, 
they were immersed in bitter polemics about the question of the mortality of the 
human intellect in the years just before 1520. Both lectured on Aristotle’s Meteo-
rology and Nifo’s commentary on it, first printed in 1523, was among the most 
frequently printed and read during the sixteenth century. Aristotle, with few ex-
ceptions, eschewed consideration of weather signs or forecasting in his Meteorol-
ogy. In the passages where he considered signs, such as in his treatment of earth-
quakes, a phenomenon he believed to be caused by subterranean winds and thus 
meteorological, the signs of future tremors were employed as evidence for the 
underlying causes.45 For example, the absence of wind that precedes and predicts 
41. Roberto Lo Presti, (Dis)embodied Thinking & the Scale of Beings: Pietro Pomponazzi & 
Agostino Nifo on the “Psychic” Processes in Men & Animals, ed. by Stefanie Buchenau, Roberto 
Lo Presti, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017, p. 47.
42. Pietro Pomponazzi, Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ed. by Gianfranco Mora, Bologna, 
Nanni & Fiammenghi, 1954, p. 216.
43. Ibid., p. 222; Arist., HA 9.31.618b12-17.
44. Pomponazzi, De immortalitate, p. 222.
45. Jean-Marc Mondasio, Meteorology and Weather Forecasting in the Middle Ages, ed. by 
Alexander Fidora, Die mantischen Künste und die Epistemologie prognostischer Wissenschaften im 
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earthquakes is evidence that vapors beneath the earth’s surface are the efficient 
cause, because the stillness in the air suggests that many destructive vapors are 
below, not above, the earth. Similarly, Nifo held that the field of meteorology 
used signs to conjecture on the causes of the weather phenomena, believing that 
because of the difficulty of the topic, many of its theories were not certain.46
Unlike Aristotle and many of his medieval and Renaissance commentators, 
Nifo tried to integrate his understanding of weather signs with his interpretation 
of Aristotle’s Meteorology. Nifo thought that On Weather Signs was written by 
Aristotle not Theophrastus, yet it was not the only source for his investigation.47 
Nifo wrote that he had «collected [signs] from good authorities», which included 
Pliny and Hippocrates.48 His understanding of weather phenomena generally, but 
especially marvelous or extreme examples, was colored by his familiarity with 
both ancient texts and more recent experiences. He cited Pliny’s enumeration of 
the specific years in which it rained wool, sponges, worms, frogs, fish, milk, and 
blood, in addition to the time it rained blood in his home town Sessa, not far from 
Naples.49 These «monstrous rains» were signs of future cataclysms, in Nifo’s 
view. These signs seemingly are causally connected to the stars, as they portend 
the same outcome that Mars and Mercury do, namely violence. Other signs while 
not monstrous are still harbingers of future evils, namely plagues and other epi-
demics. They coincide because of concomitant sublunary causes: rainy years are 
less healthy, presumably as the result of an excess of humidity.50 While Nifo in 
general was a firm proponent of astrology, many of the prognostications discussed 
in his commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology are tied to these sublunary factors. 
Hail, for example, portends a year of famine since it destroys vegetation. After 
hail melts, Nifo theorized, its liquid enters into pores in the ground where it de-
stroys plants’ powers of growth.51
In Nifo’s commentary on the Meteorology, he discussed these signs of ca-
lamities, cataclysms, and disasters together with weather signs, including those 
derived from animals. He pondered causation, although he admitted that the pro-
posed explanations were neither definitive nor complete. He wrote: «For some, a 
reason can be given, for others it cannot, but they are confirmed by observation».52 
He expressed greater confidence in establishing causes of future rain and fair 
weather that derived from the appearance of the sun and the moon than from ani-
mals. The halos, parahelia, and colors of the moon reflect the thickness of the air, 
Mittelalter, Köln, Böhlau, 2013, pp. 167-181.
46. Craig Martin, Renaissance Meteorology, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2011, pp. 33-34.
47. Agostino Nifo, In libris Aristotelis Meteorologicis commentaria, Venezia, Scoto, 1547, 
fol. 45r.
48. Ibid., fol. 44r.
49. Ibid., fol. 43v.
50. Ibid., fol. 44r.
51. Ibid., fol. 45v.
52. Ibid., fol. 45v.
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the presence of pluvial matter, or earthy exhalations in the sky, which in turn are 
the material causes of imminent weather phenomena. Inanimate bodies’ role in 
the chain of causation is more apparent than that of living beings. He was less 
certain, therefore, of the reason why animals are signs of future rain, although he 
did not doubt that they are. The commentary lists the behaviors of roosters, cranes, 
ants, frogs, cows, swallows, asses, and crows that presage rain. Despite his lack 
of certainty, Nifo provided a preliminary explanation. He wrote: «Signs from 
animals as well were collected, for which we cannot assign a cause, except from 
their sensations; for animals being less engaged and having weaker bodies per-
ceived the changes of weather».53 Animals simply feel oncoming weather better 
than humans do. Animals’ delicateness, lack of engaged intellect, and the sensi-
tivity of their powers of sensation account for why they predict the weather, ac-
cording to Nifo.
Nifo’s interest in weather signs extended beyond his commentary on Aristo-
tle’s Meteorology. He wrote what is perhaps the only Renaissance commentary 
on Theophrastus’s On Weather Signs, which was printed in 1540. While in name 
the commentary is an interpretation on the work now credited to Theophrastus, in 
essence it is Nifo’s attempt to integrate the work into natural philosophy by add-
ing causes. In order to achieve this goal, Nifo demonstrated the coherency of the 
ancient tradition of weather forecasting, integrating citations of Ptolemy, Aratus, 
Theon of Alexandria, and Pliny. Once again, the reasons for why animals are 
predictive are less developed than those for the two luminaries and aerial phe-
nomena. And once again, the causes are linked to animal sensation, as well as to 
instinct. In the section about the signs of fair weather, Nifo wrote that «many 
signs are accustomed to be taken from birds and from animals, for animals are 
moved by some kind of inborn instinct from the impression of the celestial bodies 
through the disposition of the air that leads to an understanding (cognitio) of the 
weather».54 Thus, Nifo clarified the relation between celestial powers and animal 
cognition, whereby the heavens affect the air, which in turn affects the animals. 
Animals’ actions are signs because they reflect the conditions and qualities of the 
air that are the proximate causes of changes in weather. For example, he asserted 
that mating among animals later in the year than usual is a sign of mildness be-
cause it is connected to the greater presence of humidity and coldness in the air 
during August.55
Nifo’s interests were wide-ranging. In 1531 he published De auguriis, a work 
that treats ancient customs and beliefs regarding augury. The first book describes 
ancient practices. The second book discusses objections to the plausibility and 
legitimacy of the art. He concluded that the cause of the belief in auguries was 
53. Ibid., fol. 50.
54. Agostino Nifo, De verissimis temporum signis commentariolus, Venezia, Scoto, 1540, p. 
43.
55. Ibid., p. 47.
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demonic.56 Yet, in the introduction he lent credence and gravitas to the subject by 
mentioning that Aristotle collected examples of augury in his History of Animals 
– Nifo cited the example of crows mentioned above – and believed that sneezing 
could be propitious. In his commentary on the History of Animals, Nifo was non-
committal about Aristotle’s possible endorsement of augury and limited himself 
to historical exposition. He interpreted the passage as merely showing that «the 
absence of crows signified a destruction of this sort according to the augurs of 
that region» and not necessarily according to Aristotle.57 In De auguriis, however, 
he differentiated «presages» from other kinds of omens and indications used in 
augural practice. He wrote: «A presage is more common, for each animal to pres-
age is presaging what is caused, that is, to sense the future beforehand».58 Nifo 
contended that auguries cannot work, and therefore are superstitious, because ac-
cording to Peripatetic philosophy accurate predictions can be made only when 
there is a correspondence between cause and effect. While in medicine and astrol-
ogy such connections exist – stars are causes of the arrangement of the lower 
world, and symptoms are effects of disease – in other cases, including divination 
through dreams and augury, the link is merely accidental.59 Animals as presages 
of weather fall into this acceptable category. Here, Nifo lifted material from his 
Meteorology commentary: little crows cawing frequently announces rain because 
they understand from heavenly impressions made on the air that the weather is 
changing.60
This distinction between acceptable presage and dangerous and erroneous 
augury recurs in Ulisse Aldrovandi’s Ornithologiae, a monumental volume first 
printed in 1599, which presents a natural history of birds that combines personal 
observation, humanist erudition, and a commitment to Aristotelian natural phi-
losophy. Unlike Nifo and Pomponazzi, Aldrovandi spent a large portion of his 
scholarly career observing and collecting specimens of animals.61 In the introduc-
tion to the work, he distinguished auguries from presages. He contended that 
because augury conjectures about events that depend on the human will it is in-
dependent from natural causes. Since only God has foreknowledge of these 
events, the practice is «erroneous, superstitious, and clearly contrary to holy 
Scripture».62 Aldrovandi cited Jeremiah 27 and Deuteronomy 18 in support of its 
prohibition. Other conjectural arts, such as medicine, and agriculture, that rely on 
natural causes, however, are acceptable. Accordingly, Aldrovandi not only de-
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57. Agostino Nifo, In omnes Aristotelis libros. De Historia animalium, De partibus anima-
lium, & earum causis ac de Generatione animalium, Venezia, Scoto, 1546, p. 280.
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61. Paula Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and Scientific Culture in Early 
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fended observing birds for forecasting but offered elaborate explanations of the 
natural causes that link birds’ behaviors with changes in the weather. These ex-
planations built on those found in Nifo’s work.
In contrast to the error of augury, it is possible to know why birds are pres-
ages with «great certainty». While birds do not use reason to understand changes 
in weather, they possess a «keenest natural instinct», which allows them to «per-
ceive most often changes in the weather that excite and threaten them».63 In many 
cases, avian reactions to impending weather depend on physiology and the four 
prime qualities. Aquatic birds exult at the arrival of cooling rain that will relieve 
them from hot vapors. Other birds prefer dry conditions and flee incoming wet 
weather. It is possible to predict weather from changes in birds’ song because 
intemperate wet air can affect their voice as it enters into the birds’ lungs and ar-
teries. Following the idea that changes in the air affect internal changes within 
birds, Aldrovandi put forward the natural causes behind the signs of numerous 
species of birds, combining his own personal observations with maxims taken 
from Pliny and the Georgics.64 Aldrovandi followed Nifo in distinguishing natu-
ral signs from augury and sought to define the physiological chain of causation 
that renders animals’ behaviors signs of future weather.
Conclusion
The revival of the ancient tradition of weather signs remained remarkably 
persistent. Attempts to render it relevant to meteorology and natural history recur 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Francis Bacon, in his History of 
Winds, wrote that he sought to collect the various rules for the prognostication of 
winds, paying little attention to astrology but more to the nature of meteorologi-
cal and aqueous phenomena and to the «instincts of animals».65 Indeed, toward 
the end of the history he listed 78 maxims for prognostication that include ten that 
address animal behaviors as indicators of future winds, rains, fair weather, and 
storms. The signs listed by Bacon, relating to aquatic birds, dolphins, pigs, and 
spiders all correspond to passages in Pliny’s Natural History.66 Despite there be-
ing a strongly traditional element to Bacon’s list, it perhaps represented a chal-
lenge to the astrological techniques typically employed in the annual predictions 
of weather throughout the Renaissance, as he asserted that he would ignore the 
more elaborate techniques astrologers employed.67 Using animals to foretell fu-
ture weather, however, was acceptable and even formed part of his vision for the 
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new sciences. Yet, Bacon did not consider the reason why animals might be pres-
ages of the weather, beyond his mention of instinct. At the end of the work, Bacon 
hypothesized about the matter and the causes of the winds, but he did not seek out 
an explanation or speculate why these animals’ behaviors might forecast the 
weather.68
Later naturalists, however, sought to reintroduce causation for the phenom-
ena. Even in the aftermath of the scientific revolution, authors of scientific works 
on meteorology still pondered animal signs. Giuseppe Toaldo, a professor of as-
tronomy at Padua who systematically recorded the weather in an effort to develop 
an observationally based meteorology, treated a number of signs taken from Ara-
tus in his 1770 Saggio meteorologico. An Italian translation of the Aratus’s Prog-
nostics, the second part of his didactic poem, forms an appendix to the volume. 
Toaldo reported that Nifo’s Commentariolus was one of his sources, even if this 
book, in his view, was «full of useless repetitions».69 Toaldo, like his Renaissance 
predecessors, sought not just to transmit the ancient tradition but to render it co-
herent by providing physiological explanations. But instead of the cosmological, 
astrological, and humoral explanations of Pomponazzi, Nifo, and Aldrovandi, he 
applied more recently developed theories of the workings of nature. «Organic 
beings and animal machines», he wrote, «feel the changes of the surrounding air» 
because they have the «most mobile fluids and most irritable fibers», irritability 
being a central idea of Albrecht von Haller’s understanding of the contraction of 
muscles. Animals with «their natural instincts, their more acute organs […] feel 
these impressions before we do».70
While scholars have emphasized Toaldo’s conviction that lunar effects can 
predict the weather, he chose a different explanation for animal signs.71 In the 
decades before the publication of his Saggio, Benjamin Franklin argued that 
lightning and electrically-charged sparks artificially generated and stored in Ley-
den jars were identical, and Jean-Antoine Nollet and Joseph Priestly developed 
theories of electricity as a subtle fluid.72 In Italy, Giambattista Beccaria had en-
dorsed Franklin’s experimental approach and maintained that electric fluid was 
responsible for a large number of atmospheric and meteorological phenomena. 
Following upon Franklin and Beccaria, Toaldo was among the first investigators 
into atmospheric electricity – he designed early lightning rods – and speculated 
on the existence of electricity within living bodies, applying this theory to explain 
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why animal behavior predicts future weather.73 Criticizing the approaches of Re-
naissance explanations, he wrote: «Little was understood of these signs, attrib-
uted therefore to natural divination, until the new discovery of electric-animal 
fire».74 In his view, the «delicate machines» of animals «probably» have a vital 
power of electricity, which is the «great instrument of organic movement». The 
electricity in the atmosphere that gains force from vapors and humidity affects the 
electric fire within animals. Toaldo conceded that the precise mechanism of how 
this happens was unknown but insisted that electricity offered a justification for 
traditional beliefs in animal signs.75 
Even though Toaldo’s explanation differed from Nifo’s and Aldrovandi’s, in 
some sense his project was the same. Accepting the validity of the ancient tradi-
tion of weather signs, they used current understandings of physiology and phys-
ics to provide a causal account of both popular conceptions and the rules regard-
ing animals found in the writings of antiquity’s philosophers and poets.
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